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CONTRACTS FOR THE PURCHASE OF
PROPERTY OR OF AN INTEREST IN A
BUSINESS FROM A DECEDENT'S ESTATE
WINFIELD BLACKWELL*
I. THE PROBLEMS WHICH BUSINESS MEN WANT TO SOLVE
Business men today, particularly men who own property jointly,
stockholders in close-held or family corporations and members of busi-
ness partnerships are faced with several problems as they plan their
estate and look into the future.
A man's business interests become assets of his estate at his death
unless he disposes of them in his lifetime, and pass on to others who
take under his will or by intestacy. Foresighted men realize the diffi-
culties which this creates both for a family of a decedent and for his
business associates. Principal problems are: (1) Problems of -valua-
tion of close-held assets for death tax purposes. (2) The desirability
of guaranteeing to the decedent and his family a ready market for close-
held assets and avoidance of forced liquidation. (3) Reasonable as-
surance to partners or joint owners of close-held assets or business of
continued control of the survivors in the event of one member's death.
(4) Avoidance of unnecessary delay and technical complications in
dissolving and re-forming a partnership or business upon one member's
death.
Under present day taxes, the first mentioned problem, the death
tax valuation of close-held assets is probably the most important prob-
lem of all. However, a thoughtful and skillfully drawn contract made
as a part of a general tax plan should deal with all such problems, as
well as the matter of tax valuation.
The key section from a tax standpoint is Section 811 of the Federal
Internal Revenue Code, which provides: "The value of the gross estate
of the decedent should be determined by including the value at the time
of his death of all property, . . . to the extent of the interest therein
of the decedent at the time of his death." In the case of stocks listed
and traded in on an exchange of other assets where the fair market
value at time of death can be readily established, there is little difficulty.
However, in the case of shares or stock in close-held corporation or
partnership interests, or jointly owned properties, controversies almost
invariably arise between the taxpayer's estate and the revenue agent as
to the proper valuation. Frequently the government will insist upon
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a valuation based upon such factors as capitalization of earnings, in-
trinsic or book value, etc., whichever results in the greater valuation.
In such cases the definition of "Fair Market Value" between the willing
buyer and the willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy
or sell, is not conclusively helpful.1
A survivor-purchase agreement when properly drawn obligates the
decedent's estate to sell, and the survivbr to buy, his interest at death.
It is enforceable and valid. The mutual promises of the partners are
adequate consideration. It is not testamentary in character. The price
fixed in the agreement will govern the valuation of the property for
death tax purposes.2 Such agreements are frequently called "Buy and
Sell" agreements when between partners and stockholders; "Stock Re-
tirement" agreements when providing that the corporation is to buy
shares of a stockholder upon death; and "Business Insurance" agree-
ments, when life insurance is used to provide the purchase funds.8
n. TYPES OF PROPERTY MosT FREQUENTLY INVOLVED
A. Shares of stock in close-held corporations.
The letter of the estate tax law is "value" and since it has been
held to tax such market value as there is at the time of death, everything
which affects market value, such as restrictions on the sale of the prop-
erty, must be taken into consideration. Obviously a prudent buyer would
not pay as much for restricted property as for property which can be
freely sold. Restrictive covenants on stock which make it different from
unrestricted stock in the same corporation affect its market value, pro-
vided such restricted covenants inhere in the title of the stock itself. It
is important to determine whether the corporation is a party to the
agreement, and whether the buyer is restricted in disposing of the stock
under the applicable State law, or whether the restrictive agreement is
personal only between the original seller and another. The importance
of assuring the stockholder of a close-held corporation that the stock
of any stockholder who dies should not go into unfriendly hands is
evident. Also, even where members of the family hold all of such stock
it is frequently important that stock ownership proportions be main-
tained and not disturbed by a death.
B. Partnership interests.
The importance of survivor-purchase agreements for property in-
terests is more noticeable in the case of partnership than in stock in
'U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.10.
2Wilson Estate v. Bowers, 57 F. 2d 682 (C.C.A. 2d 1932); Lomb v. Sugden,
82 F. 2d 166 (C.C.A. 2d 1936); Commissioner v. Bensel, 100 F. 2d 639 (C.C.A.
3d 1938) ; Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U.S. 106 (1936).
'Laikin & Lichter, Tax Aspects of Survvor-Purchase Agreements, [1948] Wis.
L. REv. 139.
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close-corporations. Reasons are obvious. Death of a stockholder does
not legally interrupt the continuity of the corporation's business. On
the other hand death of a partner causes the legal dissolution of the
partnership, and results in the interruption of business, requiring a sur-
viving partner to liquidate or wind up the business and make distribu-
tion, and leaves the decedent's family or estate frequently without in-
come during the period of administration and in a precarious position.
C. Jointly owned realty.
Problems arise here, usually as a result of commercial buildings or
improved real estate owned jointly by heirs, or joint owners holding
same as an investment. Clearly the same type of problems of valuation,
continued control and a ready market exist here, as in the case of
individual partnership interests.
III. METHODS OF DEALING WITH THESE -ROBLEMS AND
THEIR TAX CONSEQUENCES-
A. As to stock purchase options in general.
It can be stated that when there is a contract supported by adequate
legal consideration, the sale to be at a definite price, or by definite price
formula, and where the contract is specificially enforceable, it will be
valued at the agreed contract price for death tax purposes. 4 There are
different fact situations for which different contracts are needed.
1. Contracts of stockholders. In Commissioners v. Bensel, 100 F. 2d
639 (C.C.A. 3rd 1938) a father was principal stockholder in a close-
corporation, and his son was a highly paid and capable executive in his
father's company, but was estranged and hostile to the father. The son
was willing to continue in the compa'ny only if the father would con-
tract to allow the son an option to buy the stock at $232,500, which
price was based on the price at which sales of stock had been made at
that time. The agreement further provided that the purchase price of
the stock was to be paid to the executors of the father after his death.
At the time of the father's death the stock had increased in value and
was worth $3,049,800. The son then exercised the option. The govern-
ment claimed that the option price should not control in view of the
much higher actual fair market value at date of death. However, the
court held that the price as stated in the option was the proper valuation
for death tax purposes in the father's estate. An important factor was
the existence of adequate consideration for the option contract.
In Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F. 2d 166 (C.C.A. 2d 1936) Mrs. Lomb and
'Hughes, FEDmuL D-ATir TAx §169; Lomb v. Sugden, supra note 2; Wilson
Estate v. Bowers, supra note 2; Commissioner v. Bensel, 36 B.T.A. 246 (1937),
aff'd 100 F. 2d 639 (C.C.A. 3d 1938).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
other stockholders of Bausch and Lomb Company, contracted that no
stockholder could sell his or her stock without first offering such stock
to the other stockholders in proportion to their holding. If the others
refused to buy at the option, the owner could then sell to outsiders. The
contract further permitted any stockholder to give his stock or bequeath
it by his will to any of the other stockholders, or to give or bequeath
up to 10% to strangers. If a deceased stockholder should leave no
'issue surviving, his estate must offer the first refusal to the other stock-
holders before being free to sell to strangers. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the contract was specifically enforceable, that
it limited the decedent's right to sell it freely and required her to give
it away or to sell at the fixed price. Therefore it limited the value of
the stock to the low price at which decedent during her lifetime, or
executors at her death, were obligated to sell. A similar holding was
made in the Wilson Estate v. Bowers, 57 F. 2d 682 (C.C.A. 2d 1932)
where the option contract was supported by the reciprocal option agree-
ments as consideration. Although the person entitled to first option
was the nephew of the decedent, and although he elected to take the
shares as a legatee under the decedent's will rather than as a purchaser
under the option contract, the option price was held to govern.6
In North Carolina such agreements among the stockholders appear
to be valid and enforceable.6 See Fawcett v. Fawcett, 191 N.C. 678,
132 S.E. 796 (1926) where two bank officials and stockholders con-
tracted that the bank stock of the first one to die should be sold to the
survivor at par. It also provided that the contract could be cancelled
by either party's giving notice at any time. The question of tax value
was not involved here. However, the acceptance of the stock option
or contract price is dependent upon the contract's essential validity.
Accordingly, the court's decision was important in that it held the con-
tract specifically enforceable as supported by sufficient consideration,
that it was not contrary to public policy, and was not subject to the law
of wills. 7
2. Contracts between a key employee and decedent. The validity of
such contracts depends upon whether they are specifically enforceable
and supported by adequate consideration according to contract law. If
so, the tax valuation will be the price as fixed in the contract.8
3. Contracts between the corporation and decedent. The first ques-
See also W. R. Helmholz, Exr., 28 B.T.A. 165 (1933).
'Wright v. Iredell Tel. Co., 182 N.C. 308, 108 S.E. 744 (1921), discussed in
A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1941, 19 N.C. L. REV. 435,
470 (1941).
"See also, Greater New York Carpet House, Inc. v. Herschmann, 258 App.
Div. 649, 17 N.Y. Supp. 2d 483 (1st Dep't 1940).
8 Commissioner v. Bensel, mpra note 2. But see Armstrong's Estate v. Com-
missioner, 146 F. 2d 457 (C.C.A. 7th 1945).
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tion to be determined in each such instance is whether the general cor-
poration law permits the parties and the corporation to make and carry
out such a contract. The laws of certain states do not permit a corpora-
tion to contract to purchase shares of its own stock from the stockhold-
ers. However, in North Carolina the court has held a charter provision
enforceable which provided that stockholders could not sell their shares
without the Board of Directors' approval of any proposed buyer.9 Care
should be taken to avoid any provision which would result in the cor-
poration's purchasing such stock out of capital or which would result
in a decrease of capital stock contrary to the statutes. One line of cases
holds that a restrictive covenant in a corporation charter requiring any
stockh6lder who wishes to sell to give the first refusal to the other
stockholders at a fixed price, does not in itself conclusively determine
the value of the stock for tax purposes, but is merely a factor and should
be considered along with other relevant factors in arriving at fair market
value.10
B. Surivor-purchaser contracts in partnerships.
1. Options to buy decedent's interest. In the case of an ordinary
partnership, where one partner dies the partnership is terminated and
the value of his property interest consists of his right to share in what
remains of the partnership assets, after all its liabilities have been satis-
fied and the net assets are distributed in kind or sold and divided in
cash to the several partners according to their interests." It is obvious
that in such cases it is extremely difficult to determine what is the fair
market value of such an interest at the date of deceased partner's death.
If a contract is entered into during the partner's lifetime, and if the
option is binding on the partner during his lifetime, the valuation at the
time of his death will be the price fixed in the option contract. It is
emphasized that the option must be binding during the decedent's life-
time. The valuation will not control for death tax purposes if at all
times prior to the actual moment of his death he was free to deal with
the property as he saw fit. In such cases a power expired at his death
and passed from him.
However, the mere fact that a contract is in the form of an option
giving the survivor the right to purchase after decedent's death, rather
than being a contract obligating the survivor to buy, does not invalidate
the valid and binding effect of the option if otherwise complete and
enforceable.
'Wright v. Iredell Tel. Co., supra note 6.
" Krauss v. United States, 140 F. 2d 510 (C.C.A. 5th 1944) (gift tax) ; F. A.
Koch, Exr. v. Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 363 (1933) (restrictive covenant in by-
laws requiring stockholders to give first refusal to corporation or other stock-
holders at a stated price) ; C. P. Chamberlin, 2 T.C.M. 649 (1943) ; Worchester
County Tr. Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F. 2d 967 (C.C.A. 8th 1946) (gift tax).
" Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1 (1928).
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2. Contracts binding survivors to buy decedent's interest. There
are numerous advantages in drafting the contracts so as to bind the
decedent's estate to sell, and the survivors to buy, the decedent's in-
terest in the partnership. A few of such advantages are: the business
future of the surviving partners is assured; liquidating losses to the
survivors are avoided; the survivors avoid having to become liquidating
trustees and the details and burden of a fiduciary relationship with the
decedent's estate; the purchase contract will be enforced by the courts,
if necessary; as to the benefits to the estate, it has an assurance of
receiving payment at a fixed price for the decedent's interest; decedent's
estate can be settled promptly and efficiently; members of decedent's
family are partially relieved of business worries; and the tax valuation
controversy is minimized.
3. "Profit sharing agreements" for decedent's estate or family.
a. Income tax consequences. There are different types of partner-
ships. One type is where considerable capital investment is involved and
the partnership earnings are largely attributable to the capital assets. An-
other type is where very little capital is required, such as a professional
partnership of attorneys, doctors, or other professional men, and where
most of the income depends upon personal services. In some types of
partnerships a long time is required to realize and collect the income,
whereas in others the business is largely on a C.O.D. basis. Many
partners realize the sudden and drastic decrease in their families' income
which will result when the principal earning power of the family unit
is cut off by the death of the partner. Accordingly, it is frequently de-
sired that provision be made in the partnership agreement for income
payments to be continued for a certain period of time after the death
of the deceased partner to his estate or family. Such agreements some-
times provide for income payments to be made to his estate or widow,
whereas others provide that the surviving partners must form a new
partnership and admit the widow or some other members of decedent's
family as a partner for a certain period of time. There are certain
tax dangers to be guarded against, in particular the estate tax conse-
quences and the income tax consequences of such arrangement. The
principal point to remember at all times is that it is a problem of
accurate and complete draftsmanship of the agreement. Details must
necessarily vary with each partnership agreement and the particular
circumstances desired. However, the important part is so to plan the
agreement as to minimize the total income taxes and death taxes which
will become payable upon the death of the partner. The federal income
tax provides that "in the case of the death of a taxpayer there shall be
included in computing net income and for the taxable period in which
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falls the date of his death, amounts accrued up to the date of his death
... ." Unless a partnership agreement is properly drawn, a deceased
partner's estate may be required to pay income tax on certain amounts
representing income accrued to the date of his death, although not ac-
tually received in cash by him as a partner, plus federal estate tax on
the exact same amount of accrued income at date of death, plus income
tax on sums which may be paid to his executors as share of earnings
after his death if provided under the particular partnership contract.
In the leading case of Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1934), Mr.
Bull was a partner in a ship broker's firm. Substantially little invested
capital assets were needed. The partnership contract provided for the
survivors to pay the deceased partner's estate his share of profits earned
for one year after his death and that the business should be continued
for that purpose for one year with the estate to "share profits or losses."
The Supreme Court held that all profits accruing to the deceased partner
up to and before date of death are taxable to him as income, and that
such amount is also taxable as part of the corpus of his estate under
federal estate tax. The court also held that monies paid to his execu-
tors as share of earnings after death are income only. The court
pointed the way for correct draftsmanship by stating that if the part-
nership contract had provided that the interest of the deceased partner
in the partnership shall be acquired by the surviving partners by paying
certain purchase price payments to the estate, the transaction would be
a sale and the payments to the estate would not be taxable as income
to the estate but would be taxable as income to the surviving partners.
Such so-called double taxation of the same amounts of money under the
income tax and under the estate tax has been held constitutional.'
2
Another danger to be avoided is that more than a full year's income
can possibly be taxed in a single income tax return for a deceased part-
ner, by carelessly drafted provisions for his estate to share in partner-
ship earnings after death.' 3 The more desirable method of drafting
in most cases would appear to be provision for the surviving partners
to pay to the decedent's estate payments for the decedent's interest in
the partnership by way of the purchase price for his interest in the
capital assets owned and good will. In that way such payments would
be received by the decedent's estate without being considered income
subject to the income tax, and their total amount would be the valuation
of his partnership interest for estate tax purposes only.
In drafting any such partnership'agreement, however, the particular
desires of the partners must be reconciled. A younger partner who
"2Darcy v. Commissioner, 66 F. 2d 581 (C.C.A. 2d 1933).
" Guaranty Trust Co., Exr. v. Commissioner, 303 U.S. 493 (1938) ; McClennen
v. Commissioner, 131 F. 2d 165 (C.C.A. 1st 1942) (an attorney vhose estate was
taxed with 18 month's income after death).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
might feel that his life expectancy would be longer than an older part-
ner might prefer to have the agreement provide for a continuation of
income for a certain period of time after decedent's death to the dece-
dent's estate with a corresponding lesser amount to be paid by him as
surviving partner as the purchase of the decedents interest in the part-
nership. In such way the amount of income payments to the decedent's
estate would be taxable as income to the decedent's estate and not to
the surviving partner. On the other hand, an older member of a part-
nership who might expect his death to occur before some of the younger
partners, might wish to have the provision to make the greater portion
of the payments to be considered as part of the purchase price for his
interest in the capital and good will of the partnership, and to have a
lesser proportion made as income payments after death to his estate.
His estate would thus only be taxed on the purchase price as a part of
his taxable estate. Other considerations obviously are to estimate the
approximate estate tax bracket in which the particular partner's estate
would fall, and also to estimate his income tax bracket and the income
tax bracket of his estate for the period after his death, taking into con-
sideration any income payments by way of continuing partner's in-
come. 14
b. Estate tax consequences. The estate tax consequences under dif-
ferently drawn profit sharing or survivor-purchase partnership agree-
ments have been partially referred to above along with the income tax
consequences. One of the primary dangers is that the item of good
will of a partnership will be given an excessively high valuation by the
Government and that the estate of the deceased partner, unless a proper
purchase contract is in effect, finds great difficulty in giving evidence as
to the exact and proper valuation for good will. For a partnership
agreement in which it was spelled out that good will was to belong to the
survivors without any consideration and that, accordingly, the dece-
dent's interest in that good will had no taxable valuation at his death,
see Blodget v. Commissioner, 18 BTA 1050 (1930)
C. Realty purchase contracts.
Any survivor-purchase contract involving jointly owned realty
should likewise provide for the essential requirements, including the fact
of being binding upon the party from whose estate the interest is to
be purchased during his-lifetime, being supported by adequate considera-
tion, providing a definite fixed price or formula for fixing the price,
"Friedman & Silbert, Planning for the Income of at; Estate and Its Heirs, 17
FORD. L. REv. 1-37 (1948); Parlin, Accruals to Date of Death for Income Tax
Purposes, 87 U. OF PA. L. RFv. 295 (1939); Helvering v. Enright, 312 U.S. 636
(1941) ; see also, Helvering v. McGlue's Estate, 119 F. 2d 167 (C.C.A. 4th 1941)
see INT. REV. CODE §126.
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and must comply with any applicable provisions of the Statute of
Frauds or other statutes making special provision for contracts dealing
with real estate. Any undivided interest in real estate which is subject
to a substantial restriction on being sold or transferred is clearly not of
the same value as unrestricted property.' 5 An analogy is made to cases
of land restricted by law to residential use, in which case no one would
argue that such land could be valued as if it were free and available for
*business, industrial or any other purposes.
D. Insurance devices.
Life insurance has come to play an increasingly important part in
providing the means for making effective the carrying out of survivor-
purchase contracts in partnership agreements as well as in stock pur-
chase contracts and contracts for the purchase of interest of a dece-
dent's estate in other types of property after death. Many survivor-
purchase contracts which were otherwise satisfactory from a legal and
a tax standpoint, have lost their usefulness when a survivor becomes
financially unable, after the death of a decedent, to comply with his
contract to pay a full cash purchase price to the decedent's estate for
the decedent's interest in the partnership or business. Furthermore, as
pointed out in the previous section of this discussion, in many cases the
older partner or associate holds a major interest in the property which
is the subject of the survivor-purchase contract, and the younger mem-
ber, who is more likely to outlive the older one, frequently has less
financial means and ability to carry out a survivor-purchase contract
than the older member. For those reasons, insurance policies on the
lives of the several parties to a survivor-purchase contract have proved
in many cases to be most useful. The alternatives to a fund provided
by life insurance proceeds would be either to build up the anticipated
purchase price in advance through savings, to attempt to borrow the
purchase price immediately after the death, or to provide in the agree-
ment for payment of the purchase price, with or without security for the
decedent's estate. The life insurance method of financing such survivor-
purchase agreements more nearly guarantees successful completion of
the purchase plan. In effect, it is an advanced installment method of
paving the purchase price for the deceased partner's interest. Such
agreement providing for financing by life insurance policies rests on
the same basis as similar agreements which do not include the insurance
feature, and, if otherwise properly drawn, are binding and enforceable. 16
The essential things which the insured survivor-purchase contract
" Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189 (1910).
16 Coe v. Winchester, 43 Ariz. 500, 33 P. 2d 286 (1934) ; Lockwood's Trustee
v. Lockwood, 250 Ky. 262, 62 S.W. 2d 1053 (1933) ; see First Nat'l Bk of Rome v.
Howell, 195 Ga. 72, 23 S.E. 2d 415 (1942) (where agreement obviously not drawn
by attorney) ; Kavanaugh v. Johnson, 290 Mass. 587, 195 N.E. 797 (1935).
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should include are: a definite obligation, rather than a mere option, on
the part of all the partners, by which they agree, binding their estates
also, that the surviving partners will buy and the deceased partner's
estate will sell to the survivor or survivors the partnership interest of
a deceased partner; a definite commitment as to the amount of the pur-
chase price or exact method by which purchase price will be determined;
a definite commitment by the partners to purchase and maintain life
insurance policies in an agreed amount with which to finance the pur-
chase from the estate of whichever partner may die first; a definite
commitment as to the ownership and control of the life insurance poli-
cies covered by the agreement, and the manner of disposal of the policies
on the lives of the surviving partners after death of the decedent; a
definite obligation for the surviving partners to assume all obligations
of the partnership and save the deceased partner's estate harmless there-
from; a definite commitment as to the time and manner of paying any
balance of the purchase price in excess of the insurance proceeds, and
conversely, as to the disposition of any insurance proceeds which may
be in excess of the purchase price.
The persons who are to have the benefit of the insurance must, of
course, have a legal insurable interest in the life of the one to be in-
sured. In North Carolina, the law was specifically amended in 1941
to provide that they have an insurable interest in the life of an asso-
ciate, where they have contracted for the purchase by the survivors of
the stock of a deceased associate.
17
IRC Sec. 22 (b) (1) excludes from taxable income of the recipient
the proceeds of life insurance paid on the insured's death. The in-
surance proceeds will not be included in the taxable estate of the de-
cedent whose life was insured unless he paid the premiums, directly or
indirectly, or possessed any of the incidents of ownership at the time
of his death. Accordingly, no partner should apply for or control or
have any incidents of ownership in the policy on his own life nor should
the proceeds be payable to his estate or family as beneficiaries, nor
should the partnership pay the premiums. In order to assure the de-
cedent's estate that the insurance proceeds will actually be used for the
purposes intended and required by the survivor-purchase contract, it
is frequently desirable to have the insurance policies held by a trustee
with the proceeds payable to the trustee who shall have the duty of
applying the same to the purchase, promptly after death, of the dece-
dent's interest.
If the partners are equal partners, the problem is -simpler than the
case where the partners have different percentages of ownership in the
" N. C. Pub. Laws 1941, c. 20; N. C. GEzT. STA . §58-104 (1943); see also,
19 N.C. L. REv. 490 (1941).
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assets of the business and in the profits. A problem of the proper pro-
portionate payment of premiums on the life insurance policy also arises
where the partners' insurance ages are different. The matter is simply
one of agreement. The premiums may be pooled, and paid equally, or
may be paid in accordance with the proportionate share of the partner-
ship interest which the paying partner has at the time of making the
agreement, or in accordance with the proportionate share of the partner-
ship which the paying partner will have after another partner dies and
his interest is acquired. Another advantage of having the individuals
own the policies on the life of the other partner or partners and pay
the premiums is to avoid having the policies included in the partnership
assets, subject to immediate claim by partnership creditors against the
cash surrender value.' 8 In order to prevent the insurance proceeds
from being subject to income tax under the exception which occurs
where a policy has been transferred for value to someone other than
the insured during his lifetime, one should avoid the transfer and use
of personal insurance owned prior to entering into the survivor-purchase
agreement.
E. A few tax pitfalls, and how to draft agreements.
Will an otherwise valid survivor-purchase contract lose its effective-
ness in fixing valuation for estate tax purposes by a kinship relation
between the survivor and the decedent? The answer appears to be that
such relationship will not invalidate the contract if otherwise valid, and
if supported by a valid and full consideration. If the option or pur-
chase contract prescribes a price at which the survivor may buy which
is less than the economic money's worth at the time the contract was
entered into, the fact of blood relationship between the parties would
undoubtedly be a factor justifying the holding that the transaction
amounted to a transfer or gift in contemplation of or taking effect at
death.19 However, as graphically illustrated in the Wilson case, supra,
and the Lomb case, supra, the blood relationship of the survivor-option
holder did not prevent the Court from holding that the option price
should govern as the valuation, although the option price was greatly
less than the fair market value at the date of death.
It need hardly be pointed out that such survivor-purchase option
should not be placed in a decedent's will, if the benefits described above
are desired. The option must be binding during the lifetime, otherwise
the owner would have had it in his power until the moment of death
"' Bohnsack v. Detroit Trust Co., 292 Mich. 167, 290 N.W. 367 (1940) ; Greater
New York Carpet House, Inc. v. Herschmann, supra note 7; 3 P-H WILLs,
EsTATEs & TRusTs S-.v. 8001 (1948).
" INT. REV. CODE §22 (b) (2).
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to dispose of the property freely at the then fair market value. See
Delone v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1188 (1946).
A survivor-purchase contract need not be "frozen," but may be
amended from time to time by mutual agreement. The contract could
provide for its expiration on a certain date and for its renewal from
time to time by mutual agreement with a revision in the option or con-
tract price from time to time, so long as it clearly stated that the last
previous option or contract price continues in binding effect until the
expiration date or until superseded by a renewal agreement.
It is also safe planning to create an absolute obligation to sell. See,
Fostoria Glass Co. v. Yoke, 45 F. Supp. 962 (D.C. W. Va. 1942).
It should be emphasized again that this paper is not intended to be
comprehensive, nor is it intended to be a draftsman's form. It is pri-
marily a check list to remind the attorney of the various essential factors
which should be dealt with and covered in a survivor-purchase con-
tract.2 0 An alert attorney in drafting any such agreement will refresh
himself as to the matters upon which the parties to the agreement must
specifically agree. In particular, he should see to it: that the agreement
states clearly whether the purchase price includes the full valuation of
any good will of the business interest or not; that the option or contract
purchase price is intended to be a purchase price for the capital or
property interest of the deceased and in no way includes any sum which
is in the nature of income, if that is the agreement, and if not, he should
spell out clearly exactly what portion of the payments to the decedent's
estate are to be considered as income to the decedent's estate and whether
such represents income to the decedent's estate prior to death or after
death. Truly, drafting such contracts as these proves the wisdom of
"a stitch in time saves nine."
Armstrong's Estate v. Commissioner, 146 F. 2d 457 (C.C.A. 7th
1945) is a case illustrating the pitfalls of unwary drafting. There an
owner of stock of a close corporation assigned stock during his lifetime
to a trustee, who was to pay the income to the settlor's wife for her
life. An option was given to a trusted employee to buy the stock at any
time within five years after the settlor's death for $25,000. The trust
was revocable during the settlor's life by his signature and the em-
ployee's, or by the employee's ceasing to be an employee of the company
or dying, etc. No consideration was given by the employee for the op-
tion. The court held that the trust and the shares of stock at their full,
fair market valuation at date of death, were subject to federal estate tax
as a transfer in contemplation of or to take effect at dath, and that the
government was not required to limit the valuation of the stock to the
price defined in the option. Also, see Delone v. Commissioner, supra,
2 0 INT. REcv. CODE §811 (c).
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an income tax case, for an example of tax losses due to bad drafts-
manship.
It is interestinig to note an opinion of the Attorney General of North
Carolina, dated February 19, 1940 stating that a "decedent does not
have the power to determine the value of his estate or any part thereof
by an intervivos option to sell." However, the statute law does not
appear to go as far as the Attorney General's opinion. General Statutes
Sec. 105-9 uses the words "in determining the clear market value of
property taxed under this Article, . . ." General Statutes Sec. 105-29
provides that if the amount of the decedent's estate "as assessed and
fixed by the Federal Government" is more than that previously fixed
for State inheritance tax purposes, the North Carolina Commissioner
shall reassess and fix the value at the amount as fixed by the Federal
Government. General Statutes See. 105-7 (c) also provides that the
amount of the North Carolina tax shall be computed in full accordance
with the Federal Estate Tax Act. Accordingly, in the light of the
Federal Act and decisions construing its applicability to such survivor-
purchase contracts, the procedure for purposes of the North Carolina
death taxes will probably substantially conform.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the author wishes to point out two facts. First, there
is no assurance that the existing line of court decisions will remain
undisturbed by the Supreme Court. However, the planning of estates
and the making of business decisions can only be done according to the
best current condition of the law. Second, it is believed that the im-
portance of survivor-purchase contracts and of tax and business plan-
ning in that field should continue to expand and grow rather than to
diminish. Authorities agree that the trend of business is toward de-
centralization, and (the Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Jus-
tice to the contrary) that the number of small and middle sized business
units is steadily growing. As a result there is a constant stream of
close-held businesses, whether in the form of corporations, partnerships
or otherwise, in which the men who are associated together need to
make provision for purchasing the interests in the business of any of
their members who may die and the corollary need to provide a ready
and satisfactory market for the interest of a deceased member for the
benefit of his family. Finally, and not least, there is the desirability of
avoiding the delay, uncertainty and expense of tax litigation after a
member's death as to the correct valuation of his interest.
